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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
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SPRINKLER COMPANY, a Utah ) 
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Plaintiffs-
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v. 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
* * * * * * * 
Case No. 17096 
BRIEF OF CROSS-CLAIM DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
* * * * * * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Cross-claimant and appellant, Navalco of Utah ("Navalco"), 
seeks to overturn the finding of the lower court that it waived 
its cross-claim against Green Acres of America ("Green Acres") 
for failure to present the cross-claim to the trial court. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Based upon the representations of counsel for Navalco 
and Green Acres that settlement had been reached between the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
parties and no further action on the cross-claim was required by 
the trial court, Judge Winder did not rule on the cross-claim 
brought by Navalco as against Green Acres. Subsequently, Judge 
Durham denied Navalco's Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree whereby Navalco moved 
the court for judgment on the cross-claim of Navalco as against 
Green Acres. Judge Durham held that Navalco had waived its 
cross-claim against Green Acres by failing to present the issue 
for decision at trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the denial of the lower court's 
Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Decree affirmed on the basis that Navalco waived its 
cross-claim against Green Acres. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with that portion of appellant's 
statement of facts as it describes the lease arrangements among 
Navalco, Green Acres, and Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. and its statement 
that the Hungry Hawaiian, Inc. "engage[d] various persons to 
apply materials to the premises (e.g. Exhibit 2-P), but thereafter 
found itself unable to pay all the amounts due." Respondent 
further agrees with appellant's statements that liens were filed 
against the premises by certain of the parties named to this 
action and that all claims as against Green Acres and Roy E. and 
Carol M. Christensen were dismissed with the exception of the 
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claim between Green Acres and Lincoln, Tohara and Tohara. 
Further, respondent agrees with appellant's statements that it 
filed a cross-claim against Green Acres of America "claiming that 
pursuant to the provisions of the lease, said Defendant was 
obligated to hold Defendant-Appellant, Navalco of Utah, harmless 
for any loss in these proceedings'' and that Judge Winder made no 
ruling on said cross-claim. However, respondent controverts 
certain of the facts set forth by appellant beginning in the last 
paragraph of page 5 of its brief whereby appellant attempts to 
establish the facts underlying its failure to present its cross-
claim at trial and the subsequent finding of waiver of the cross-
claim. 
Beginning November 6, trial of the above-entitled 
matter, Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, was had before 
the Honorable David K. Winder. Pursuant to the Pre-Trial Order 
entered by the Honorable Jay E. Banks all remaining issues in the 
case were before Judge Winder for decision, including the cross-
claim of Navalco by which it sought indemnification from Green 
Acres with respect to any judgment entered against it on any 
pending mechanics' lien claims, as well as reimbursement for 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by it in defending the claims 
brought against it. (R.688) 
Prior to trial, settlement negotiations were entered 
into by counsel for Navalco, Mr. Glen H. Hatch, and counsel for 
Green Acres, Ms. Barbara K. Polich. (R. 979-980, Affidavit of 
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Glen H. Hatch). During the negotiations, Navalco sought to be 
reimbursed for only those attorneys' fees incurred by Navalco 
through the bringing of its motion for summary judgment against 
all lien claimants, despite the fact that the court denied Navalco' 
motion with respect to Action Fire Sprinkler Company and Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. Mr. Hatch stated that inasmuch as it was the 
actions of Navalco rather than the actions of Green Acres that 
caused this claim to continue to trial, Navalco should be responsi-
ble for incurring those attorneys' fees and costs. (R. 979-980, 
Affidavit of Glen M. Hatch; R. 930, Affidavit of Barbara K. 
Polich). Mr. Hatch further stated to counsel for Green Acres 
that he did not believe a judgment could be rendered against 
Navalco except to the extent that Navalco induced reliance by the 
claimants to finish the job. Specifically in his affidavit Mr. 
Hatch states that he 
[A]ssumed that the only issue involving Navalco 
remaining in the case was in the nature of an 
estoppel question as between Navalco and the 
Plaintiffs [Interiors Contracting, Inc. and 
Action Fire Sprinkler Company] resulting from 
certain conversations between the Plaintiffs 
and Navalco's agents that Affiant did not 
assume reimbursement would be required for 
this. 
(R. 979-980). 
Mr. Hatch represented to counsel for Green Acres that 
attorneys' fees had been incurred in the approximate amount of 
$2,300, which amount did not include the attorneys' fees incurred 
to continue to defend against the claims of Action Fire Sprinkler 
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Company and Interiors Contracting, Inc. subsequent to the denial 
of summary judgment. (R. 980, Affidavit of Glen M. Hatch). 
Green Acres offered to pay $2,000 of the amount incurred for 
attorneys' fees and costs if the cross-claim was dismissed in its 
entirety. Mr. Hatch at that time indicated to Ms. Polich that he 
would accept payment of $2,000 as settlement of the cross-claim. 
It was agreed that both parties would review the final written 
document setting forth the oral agreement. {R. 929-930, Affidavit 
of Barbara K. Polich). 
On that basis, a representation was made to Judge 
Winder by Ms. Polich that Green Acres and Navalco had reached a 
settlement and therefore the trial court need not consider the 
cross-claim of Navalco as against Green Acres. This representation 
was made at the close of putting on evidence on the claims pending 
between Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler 
Company and Navalco and at such time as Mr. Hatch asked leave of 
the court for his dismissal. In responding to the court's inquiry 
as to whether or not anyone had any objections to Mr. Hatch 
leaving, Ms. Polich responded as follows: 
No. I just wanted to have--there is a Cross-
Claim pending between Navalco and Green Acres, 
but we have reached a tentative settlement. So 
for your information, there will be nothing on 
that. 
(R. 1232). Mr. Hatch did not take issue with the statement of 
Ms. Polich at that time nor did he indicate to the court at any 
other time during the trial that Navalco's cross-claim was still 
viable and still before the court. 
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Subsequent to trial but prior to a decision being 
rendered, the Settlement Agreement was drafted by Ms. Polich. 
Ms. Polich called Mr. Hatch and went over each of the points of 
the Settlement Agreement. (R. 931, Affidavit of Barbara K. 
Polich). At that time the draft agreement contained provisions 
of payment to Navalco by Green Acres for $2,000, assignment to 
Green Acres of awards of attorneys' fees made to Navalco, and 
dismissal of the cross-claim in full. (R. 933-937, Settlement 
Agreement). Counsel for the parties represented that each had 
received approval from their respective clients to the terms of 
the agreement. However, it was understood that each party could 
revise the final written draft to insure it reflected the terms 
of the oral agreement. Subsequently, the agreement was sent to 
Mr. Hatch by Ms. Polich. (R. 931). 
Subsequent to December 13, 1979, the date the Memor-
andum Decision was issued by Judge Winder, Mr. Hatch reviewed the 
settlement agreement and at that time first informed counsel for 
Green Acres that Green Acres should be responsible for reim-
bursing Navalco for the judgment which had been rendered against 
it. (R. 981, Affidavit of Glen M. Hatch; R. 930-931, Affidavit 
of Barbara K. Polich). Counsel for Green Acres pointed out that 
it had been agreed by counsel as part of the settlement agreement 
that all claims were to be dismissed, including any indemnification 
claims with respect to any and all judgments rendered against 
Navalco. Mr. Hatch indicated at that time that that was not his 
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intent. He subsequently returned the settlement agreement. 
However, it is significant to note that Mr. Hatch indicated to 
counsel for Green Acres that the settlement agreement adequately 
reflected the agreement entered into by the parties with respect 
to attorneys' fees. The only issue of dispute was whether or not 
the cross-claim was to have been dismissed in total. (R. 931, R. 
981). 
At no time was any exception made in the pre-trial 
order, or by any ruling of the court during trial, to preserve 
the issue of Navalco's cross-claim against Green Acres for deci-
sion subsequent to the trial. Therefore, Green Acres did not try 
that issue nor argue it to the court, nor did Navalco do so. 
On December 18, 1979, Navalco filed its Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree to 
have the court enter an order awarding a judgment over against 
Green Acres for indemnification as well as for attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred in defending against this action and pursuing 
its cross-claim against Green Acres. Specifically, Navalco asked 
that the Conclusions of Law be amended as follows: 
Defendant, Navalco of Utah, should have 
judgment against Defendant, Green Acres of 
America, Inc., in the amounts provided in 
paragraph 1 hereinabove [setting forth the 
judgment awarded to plaintiffs as against 
Navalco] together with its costs of Court 
and such reasonable attorney's fees as are 
awarded against Navalco of Utah. In the 
event that said parties fail to settle the 
claims for attorney's fees by Navlaco of 
Utah against Green Acres of America, Inc. 
-7-
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for its expense in defending this action, 
then a reasonable attorney's fees should be 
awarded and determined in accordance with 
paragraph 5 hereinabove [granting Interiors 
Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler 
Company a reasonable attorney's fee from 
Navalco, the exact amount reserved for a 
later determination]. 
(R. 838-841, Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment and Decree). The only issues argued to the district 
court was whether or not the settlement agreement was to be enforce, 
or whether or not there had been a waiver of the cross-claim. Mr. 
Hatch filed an affidavit in support of that motion to which refer-
ence has been made above. No argument was had on the merits as 
Judge Durham indicated that if she found that Navalco still had a 
viable claim, she would request that counsel argue the merits of 
the claim. 
While the Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment and Decree was under consideration by Judge 
Durham, Navalco brought a Motion for New Trial on the cross-claim 
of Navalco against Green Acres. That motion was denied by virtue 
of Judge Durham's ruling that Navalco waived its cross-claim 
against Green Acres. (R. 993, Order and Judgment). 
ARGUMENT 
I . 
BASED UPON THE REPRESENTATIONS AND ACTIONS OF 
COUNSEL AT TRIAL IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR JUDGE 
WINDER TO NOT RULE ON THE CROSS-CLAIM OF 
NAVALCO. 
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It is the position of Navalco that because its cross-
claim against Green Acres was set forth in its initial pleadings 
and subsequently in its trial brief, it was error for Judge 
Winder to fail to rule on that cross-claim despite the repre-
sentations to Judge Winder at trial that a settlement had been 
reached between Green Acres and Navalco. A review of the circum-
stances surrounding the absence of a ruling from Judge Winder on 
the cross-claim will show that both Navalco and Green Acres had 
represented to the Court that there was no need for consideration 
by the court of that cross-claim; thus it was not error for Judge 
Winder to not rule on the cross-claim. 
Navalco states at page 13 of its brief that the cross-
claim of Navalco against Green Acres was set forth in the original 
pleadings filed by Navalco and further it was set forth in 
Navalco's trial memorandum (R. 715, Memorandum of Defendant, 
Navalco of Utah). Respondent does not dispute this statement by 
Navalco. Navalco goes on to argue that because it was its inten-
tion to rely on a lease agreement between Navalco and Green Acres 
for purposes of arguing the cross-claim, and because the lease 
was made an exhibit in the trial of the claim pending between 
plaintiffs Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler, 
and Navalco, there was no reason for Navalco to affirmatively 
argue or otherwise raise the cross-claim at trial before Judge 
Winder. Navalco further goes on to state that once judgment was 
awarded in favor of the plaintiffs and against Navalco, Judge 
Winder had a "duty to then rule upon the Cross Complaint." 
-9-
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The argument of Navalco has a serious omission. 
Specifically, Navalco fails to point out to the court that at the 
close of the case between plaintiffs and Navalco, Mr. Hatch asked 
the court that he be excused inasmuch as he had no further 
matters pending before the court. The relevant portion of the 
transcript reads as follows: 
(R. 1232). 
MR. HATCH: Assuming we now rest, are you 
going to take arguments now or try the other 
parts of the case? 
THE COURT: Well, I think we better take 
arguments all at one time, if you don't mind. 
Let's try the case because otherwise - well, of 
course, we have all got to be here for the 
whole thing. I am wondering if there isn't 
some way - at least, Mr. Anderson could leave 
at this point. 
MR. HATCH: I think both Mr. Anderson and 
myself could leave because we have Summary 
Judgments on all of the others here. Judge 
Durham granted us a Summary Judgment as to all 
of the defendants, the other defendants. 
The court then inquired as to whether or not anyone had 
any objections to Mr. Hatch and Mr. Anderson leaving. Although 
there were no objections, Ms. Polich explained to the court that 
there had been a cross-claim pending between Navalco and Green 
Acres, but the matter no longer required the decision of the 
court. Specifically, that portion of the transcript reads as 
follows: 
THE COURT: Well, does anyone have any 
objection to Mr. Hatch and Mr. Anderson leaving 
or can you think of any reason why they ought 
to be required to remain at this point? 
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MS. POLICH: No. I just wanted to have -
there is a cross-claim pending between Navalco and 
Green Acres, but we have reached a tentative 
settlement. So for your information, there will 
be nothing on that. 
THE COURT: Let me refer to the bottom of 
your Memorandum, Ms. Polich, where you talk about 
these cases. Of course, that was typed before my 
ruling this morning on Gray's Electric. So it --
the only claims that do remain are Mr. Lincoln, 
Mr. Tohara and Mr. Tohara against Green Acres and 
the one we just heard and then Gray's Electric 
against Green Acres. Is that it? 
MS. POLICH: That is correct. 
(R. 1232-1233). 
It is significant to note that Mr. Hatch at no time 
disagreed with Ms. Polich's statement that a settlement had been 
reached between Navalco and Green Acres and that the court need 
not consider the claim. Also, when the court, in insuring that 
it understood all the claims before it for consideration, ex-
plicitly identified each of the claims it intended to consider 
and did not include the cross-claim of Navalco, Mr. Hatch said 
nothing. If it was the intention of Mr. Hatch that Judge Winder 
rule on the claim between Navalco and Green Acres, he certainly 
did not evidence that to the court. 
Subsequently, the closing argument was had on the claim 
between Interiors Contracting, Inc. and Action Fire Sprinkler 
Company and Navalco. At the close of argument, Mr. Hatch asked 
if he might be dismissed. The court responded that "Mr. Hatch 
and Mr. Anderson and their clients may be excused." (R. 1254). 
No closing arguments were had on the cross-claim between Navalco 
and Green Acres of America. 
-11-
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Given that a representation was made to Judge Winder 
that a settlement agreement had been reached between Navalco and 
Green Acres, coupled with Mr. Hatch's acquiescence in the court's 
identification of the claims still pending before him, which 
identification did not include the cross-claim between Green 
Acres and Navalco, it was not error for Judge Winder to not rule 
on the cross-claim pending between Navalco and Green Acres. The 
circumstances of the case clearly establish that it could not 
have been the intent of Navalco to receive a ruling by Judge 
Winder on the cross-claim. 
I I . 
IT WAS NOT ERROR FOR JUDGE DURHAM TO FIND THAT 
NAVALCO HAD WAIVED IT CROSS-CLAIM FOR FAILURE 
TO PRESENT THE CLAIM AT TRIAL. 
The record of the case clearly demonstrates that 
Navalco neither presented its cross-claim against Green Acres at 
trial nor reserved the claim for resolution at a later time; 
therefore, Judge Durham properly denied Navalco's Motion to Amend 
Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree on 
the basis that Navalco waived its cross-claim against Green 
Acres. 
Judge Durham, in ruling on Navalco's Motion to Amend 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree, 
correctly stated the law and applied it to its facts of the 
instant case as is evidenced in her Memorandum Opinion dated 
April 23, 1980. (R. 988-989). The relevant portion of that 
Memorandum Opinion reads as follows: 
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( R. 988) • 
1. Navalco's Motion to Amend is denied. 
The transcript of the trial shows that Navalco 
waived it cross-claim against Green Acres by 
failing to submit it to the court for ruling at 
the time of trial, and by not objecting when 
opposing counsel indicated to the court that it 
was settled and did not require a ruling. 
There was nothing to prevent its litigation at 
trial, and it was no where specifically reserved. 
Therefore, the general rule that issues which 
could have been raised may not be thereafter 
li~ig~ted is applicable, and res judicata 
principles govern. The fact that the chances 
of succeeding on the cross-claim look better 
after trial than they did before and during 
does not give rise to a right to belatedly 
raise a claim that could have been disposed of 
at trial, but was not because of the acquiescence 
of counsel. 
It is clearly the law in Utah that unless a claim is 
explicitly reserved for determination at a later time, all claims 
pending before the trial court are to be resolved at the time of 
trial. Clegg v. Lee, 30 Utah 2d 242, 248, 516 P.2d 348 (1973). 
Orderly procedure requires that a party must 
present his entire case and his theory or 
theories to the trial court, and he cannot 
thereafter urge a different theory in an attempt 
to prolong litigation. [Footnote omitted.] 
If this were not the rule of law, it would be possible for cases 
to be tried piecemeal as the losing party found elements which it 
had previously failed to litigate. 
This Court explicitly ruled in Upton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 
I 573, 223 P.2d 428 (1950) that where a party can present an issue 
at trial but chooses not to do so, the issue is waived and cannot 
-13-
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subsequently be revived. In Upton a pre-trial order allowed the 
defendant to introduce evidence establishing that the tax deeds 
involved in the suit were invalid. The court ruled that failure 
of the defendant to introduce the evidence constituted waiver of 
that issue and therefore, defendants were precluded from raising 
it before the Supreme Court. 
It may be that, under the pre-trial order as 
framed, the defendants could have proceeded to 
introduce evidence establishing that the tax 
deeds were invalid. They did not, however, 
choose to do so, and thus waived this issue in 
the trial court, and may not now raise it 
before this court. 
223 P.2d at 430. 
And in Amoss v. Bennion, 30 Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d 1008 
(1973) the Ccourt affirmed the district court's dismissal of 
appellant's claim when appellant elected not to go forward with a 
new trial. The appellant had been contending that the setting 
aside of the jury verdict and granting a new trial was error and 
therefore chose not to proceed with a new trial of the issues. 
The court noted that the issue was not "reserved for future conside1 
ation by stipulation of the parties and the decree of the court 
entered therein is res adjudicata." 517 P.2d at 1010. 
A review of the record shows that Judge Durham was 
correct in finding that Navalco neither presented the claim at 
trial nor reserved the claim for later determination by the 
court. Specifically, this finding is supported by the following 
facts which have been extensively detailed above. 
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1. Mr. Hatch acquiesed in the statement of counsel for 
Green Acres that the cross-claim of Navalco against Green Acres 
had been settled. 
2. When Judge Winder indicated those claims still 
pending before him and did not indicate that the cross-claim of 
Navalco as against Green Acres was still pending before him, Mr. 
Hatch again acquiesed in the statement, having said nothing. 
3. No evidence was put on at trial, nor was any closing 
argument had on the Navalco cross-claim. 
4. The transcript established that there was no 
explicit reservation of the claim for a later determination by the 
court. 
It further appears from the record that Mr. Hatch simply 
did not even consider the possibility of a judgment against Navalco 
for the total amount of work performed by plaintiffs, Action Fire 
Sprinkler Company and Interiors Contracting, Inc. As Mr. Hatch 
states in his affidavit: 
Affiant indicated to Ms. Polich that in his 
opinion Defendant's reimbursement should be 
based upon services through the granting of 
summary judgment against all other Defendants, 
but that since Af fiant assumed that the 
only issue involving Navalco remaining in 
the case was in the nature of an estoppel 
question as between Navalco and the Plain-
tiffs resulting from certain conversations 
between the Plaintiffs and Navalco's agents 
that [sic] Affiant did not assume reimburse-
ment would be required for this. 
(R. 979-980). The fact that Mr. Hatch assumed and relied on his 
belief that Navalco could be found liable only for that portion of 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the work performed by the lien claimants as a result of reliance 
upon Navalco's assurances of payment is clearly evidenced by the 
fact that Navalco sought only reimbursement by Green Acres of 
those attorneys' fees incurred through the bringing of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 979). But it simply makes no sense that 
Mr. Hatch would initially take the position that Green Acres was 
not liable for any of the attornys' fees incurred in Navalco going 
to trial because it was Navalco's own actions which caused the 
claims to continue to trial, and then later argue that the cross-
claim between Navalco and Green Acres was still viable and before 
the trial court with respect to indemnification by Green Acres of 
Navalco. 
It appears that Mr. Hatch was so certain that Navalco could 
be held responsible for only a small portion of the work done by 
the lien claimants (that which was induced by reliance upon Navalco 1 
statements) that he did not see any reason to present the cross-
claim to the court. However, the underlying reason for Mr. Hatch 
not presenting the cross-claim does not change the fact that the 
cross-claim was neither presented to the trial court nor reserved. 
Mr. Hatch, by second guessing what Judge Winder would rule and by 
choosing not to put on his claim took a risk that his failure to 
put on the claim would cause its waiver. Very simply put, Mr. 
Hatch took the risk and lost. And in accordance with the law of 
this jurisdiction as set forth in Upton v. Heiselt, 118 Utah 573, 
223 P.2d 428 (1950) and Amoss v. Bennion, 30 Utah 2d 312, 517 P.2d 
1008 (1973), under such circumstances Navalco waived its claim. 
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Lastly, appellant states at page 14 of its brief that 
because the Navalco/Green Acres' lease was before the court, there 
was no need to argue the· cross-claim to Judge Winder. Respondent 
finds it interesting that appellant believes that Green Acres 
would waive any and all right to argue the matter before the 
court, if not put on evidence with respect thereto. Respondent 
had taken a very active role throughout the litigation and would 
have, under no circumstances, forfeited the right to argue its 
position on the cross-claim to the trial court. 
Inasmuch as it was the actions and acquiesence of Mr. 
Hatch that caused Judge Winder to not rule on the cross-claim 
between Navalco and Green Acres, it would be unfair and burdensome 
to now reopen the cross-claim and require that Green Acres continue 
to litigate this matter. Inasmuch as the outcome of the indemnifi-
cation claim is known, settlement would now be straightjacketed in 
a way unlike prior to trial of the claim. That is, any chance of 
Green Acres to realize a true compromise settlement is destroyed 
because the liability of Navalco will be known. Navalco chose the 
manner and timing in which it desired to pursue it cross-claim 
against Green Acres and it should be held responsible thereto. 
Given the above, it is clear that Mr. Hatch did not 
believe Green Acres was liable for any of the work done by Action 
Fire Sprinkler Company and Interiors Contracting, Inc. as a result 
of their reliance on Navalco; therefore, inasmuch as Mr. Hatch did 
not believe there was any possibility, whatsoever, of an adverse 
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ruling with respect to the remainder of those lien claims, it 
follows that he did not believe that a ruling by Judge Winder on 
the cross-claim was necessary. The resulting conclusion must be 
that the claim was neither presented at trial nor reserved; there-
fore, the finding of Judge Durham that Navalco waived its cross-
claim should be affirmed by this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the above, it is clear that Navalco waived its 
cross-claim for indemnification and attorneys' fees against Green 
Acres. Therefore, the denial by Judge Durham of appellant's 
Motion to Amend Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and Decree and the subsequent denial of appellant's Motion for New 
Trial should be affirmed by this court. 
Respectfully subitted this 15th day of September, 1980. 
BARBARA K. POLICH 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
79 South State Street 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of September, 
1980, I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent to Glen Hatch, Haslam & Hatch, 80 West Broadway, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101. 
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